The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
DOI10.1287/opre.1110.0979zbMath1241.91026OpenAlexW2117819361MaRDI QIDQ2893922
Konstantin Miller, Tobias Harks
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0979
resource allocation gamesnetwork routing gamesinefficiency of equilibriamarginal cost pricingcost sharing methods
Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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