The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.003zbMath1337.91025OpenAlexW2788972584WikidataQ48618616 ScholiaQ48618616MaRDI QIDQ289456

Maja Schlüter, Alessandro Tavoni, Simon A. Levin

Publication date: 30 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96843/files/NDL2010-127.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorycommon pool resourceostracismsocial norm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment ⋮ Evolving cooperation ⋮ Long-time behavior of a PDE replicator equation for multilevel selection in group-structured populations ⋮ Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources ⋮ Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems ⋮ Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication ⋮ Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions

Cites Work

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• Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation
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• Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions
• A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems
• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
• An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation

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