Predicting Bidders' Willingness to Pay in Online Multiunit Ascending Auctions: Analytical and Empirical Insights

DOI10.1287/ijoc.1070.0247zbMath1243.91053OpenAlexW2008181656MaRDI QIDQ2901017

Ravi Bapna, Gilbert Karuga, Paulo B. Goes, Alok Gupta

Publication date: 28 July 2012

Published in: INFORMS Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a4723475ccbe178600db80184be2a470dae4f3b9

zbMATH Keywords

online auctionsdynamic-mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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