Deceit and indefeasible knowledge: the case of dubitatio

DOI10.3166/JANCL.21.503-519zbMath1242.03041OpenAlexW2097601855MaRDI QIDQ2901224

Sara L. Uckelman

Publication date: 17 July 2012

Published in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3166/jancl.21.503-519

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintydynamic epistemic logicobligationesdubitatiohard knowledgehigher-order knowledge revisionsoft knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision
• Dynamic epistemic logic
• Two modellings for theory change
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Learning by Questions and Answers: From Belief-Revision Cycles to Doxastic Fixed Points

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