Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.009zbMath1347.91106OpenAlexW2305690886MaRDI QIDQ290156

Fabian Paetzel, Matthias Greiff

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

conditional cooperationendogenous evaluationsindirect reciprocitynoisy reputationsecond-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Gossip and the efficiency of interactions ⋮ The impact of fraud on reputation systems ⋮ Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Competition fosters trust
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
• A theory of reciprocity
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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