Median stable matchings in two-sided markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004zbMath1347.91202OpenAlexW2306544911MaRDI QIDQ290162

F. Blanchet-Sadri, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchingmatching with contractslaw of aggregate demandmany-to-one matching with wagesmedian stable matchingsstrong substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Median stable matchings in two-sided markets ⋮ Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets ⋮ Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions ⋮ Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings ⋮ Quantile stable mechanisms ⋮ Hesitant fuzzy linguistic two-sided matching decision making

Cites Work

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• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications

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