Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.009zbMath1347.91185OpenAlexW2342435329MaRDI QIDQ290164

Stefan Terstiege

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/0aca43c2-4c3a-48d5-b7de-801ee63cf9a4

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionsequential screeningprincipal agentrent seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

A note on robust procurement contracts

Cites Work

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• Contracts with endogenous information
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Sequential Screening
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
• Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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