Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.003zbMath1347.91108OpenAlexW3124201043MaRDI QIDQ290168

Kiryl Khalmetski

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

guilt aversionpsychological gameslying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Guilt aversion in (new) games: does partners' payoff vulnerability matter? ⋮ Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Promises and Partnership

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