COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA

DOI10.1142/S021919891100285XzbMath1247.91074OpenAlexW2170065267MaRDI QIDQ2907965

Sascha C. Füllbrunn

Publication date: 4 September 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmulti unit auctionsprisoners's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The observed choice problem in estimating the cost of policies
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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