A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002885zbMath1246.91012MaRDI QIDQ2907968

Evan Shellshear

Publication date: 4 September 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcorecooperative gamefuzzy coalitionfuzzy gamecore stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Market games in large economies with a finite number of types
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Locally Lipschitz cooperative games
• Prosperty properties of TU-games
• On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Comment on "The Law of Large Demand for Information"
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

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