Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics in Asymmetric Two-Population Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_3zbMath1246.91014OpenAlexW1584496882MaRDI QIDQ2908414

Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, Elvio Accinelli

Publication date: 5 September 2012

Published in: Dynamics, Games and Science I (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive ⋮ Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition ⋮ A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS-ED interface

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• Non-cooperative games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• A vector Lyapunov approach to the stability problem for the n-population continuous time replicator dynamics

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