Poverty Traps, Rationality and Evolution

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_4zbMath1246.91099OpenAlexW152452443WikidataQ59278688 ScholiaQ59278688MaRDI QIDQ2908416

Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, Lionello F. Punzo, Elvio Accinelli, Silvia London

Publication date: 5 September 2012

Published in: Dynamics, Games and Science I (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Economic dynamics (91B55) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

Nash equilibrium in evolutionary competitive models of firms and workers under external regulation

Cites Work

• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
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