On When a Disjunction Is Informative

DOI10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_1zbMath1284.03021OpenAlexW1504122544MaRDI QIDQ2908754

Patrick Allo

Publication date: 29 August 2012

Published in: The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_1

zbMATH Keywords

logical pluralisminformational pluralism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (1)

A Paraconsistent and Substructural Conditional Logic

Cites Work

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• Special issue: Impossible worlds
• Information and impossibilities
• Relevant logic and the theory of information
• Substructural logics: a primer
• Quine and Slater on paraconsistency and deviance
• Logical pluralism and semantic information
• What might be the case after a change in view
• Information Flow
• Logical Pluralism
• Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics

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