Analysis of M-stationary points to an EPEC modeling oligopolistic competition in an electricity spot market
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Publication:2911436
DOI10.1051/cocv/2011003zbMath1281.90056OpenAlexW2158925909MaRDI QIDQ2911436
René Henrion, Jiří V. Outrata, Thomas M. Surowiec
Publication date: 31 August 2012
Published in: ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eudml.org/doc/221922
calmnessEPECelectricity spot marketequilibrium problems with equilibrium constraintsM-stationary solutions
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