Hidden patterns of reciprocity

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.12.011zbMath1338.91111OpenAlexW2054536088WikidataQ50700746 ScholiaQ50700746MaRDI QIDQ291606

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Publication date: 10 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.011

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gamespunishmentindirect reciprocitydirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata

Cites Work

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• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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