REPUTATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS

DOI10.1017/S1365100510000076zbMath1250.91070MaRDI QIDQ2920156

Guoqiang Tian, Kevin X. D. Huang

Publication date: 24 October 2012

Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policyreputationtime consistencyoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

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