REPUTATIONAL BIDDING
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Publication:2921195
DOI10.1111/iere.12067zbMath1405.91230OpenAlexW2320120910MaRDI QIDQ2921195
Francesco Giovannoni, Miltiadis Makris
Publication date: 7 October 2014
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/69625/1/ReputationalbiddingIER_MS24025-3.pdf
Related Items (8)
Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction ⋮ Entry in first-price auctions with signaling ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Information design in multistage games ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition ⋮ Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
Cites Work
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
- Professional advice
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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