Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_6zbMath1300.91013OpenAlexW1039042566MaRDI QIDQ2926598

Dai Zusai

Publication date: 31 October 2014

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsproper equilibriumpayoff monotone selections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels ⋮ Tempered best response dynamics

Cites Work

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• Quality improvement vs. advertising support: which strategy works better for a manufacturer?
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Tempered best response dynamics
• Fictitious play in extensive form games
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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