Conditions for Cooperation and Trading in Value-Cost Dynamic Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_9zbMath1300.91020OpenAlexW1852468154MaRDI QIDQ2926601

Jürgen Scheffran

Publication date: 31 October 2014

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_9

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesmarket priceconjectural variationeconomic tradinginteraction stabilityvalue-cost dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) Dynamic games (91A25)

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