Estimating the supply chain efficiency loss when the seller has to estimate the buyer’s willingness to pay

DOI10.1051/RO/2014018zbMath1299.91043OpenAlexW2068506834WikidataQ125287840 ScholiaQ125287840MaRDI QIDQ2928425

Xavier Brusset

Publication date: 7 November 2014

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.numdam.org/item?id=RO_2014__48_4_477_0/

zbMATH Keywords

supply chain managementmechanism designlog-concave distributionsinformation asymmetryBayesian belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration ⋮ Pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple retailers: A game-theoretic approach ⋮ Coordinating a supply chain with negative effect of retailer’s local promotion on goodwill and reference price ⋮ Perfect matching and polymatroids ⋮ When manufacturers hold information back from strong suppliers

This page was built for publication: Estimating the supply chain efficiency loss when the seller has to estimate the buyer’s willingness to pay