New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms

DOI10.1145/1132516.1132528zbMath1300.91038OpenAlexW2039864651MaRDI QIDQ2931372

Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan

Publication date: 25 November 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1132516.1132528

zbMATH Keywords

random graphsselfish routingBraess's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (14)

Beyond Moulin mechanisms ⋮ From Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Online Selection Problems ⋮ A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing ⋮ Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms ⋮ Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences ⋮ Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems ⋮ A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing ⋮ New efficiency results for makespan cost sharing ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects ⋮ On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems ⋮ Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems ⋮ Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? ⋮ Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location ⋮ Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

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