Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:293754
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.07.010zbMath1337.91064arXiv1206.4476OpenAlexW2005804328WikidataQ50794350 ScholiaQ50794350MaRDI QIDQ293754
Simon T. Powers, Daniel J. Taylor, Joanna J. Bryson
Publication date: 9 June 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.4476
Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)
Related Items (6)
Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Prejudice, privilege, and power: conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups ⋮ Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm ⋮ Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
- Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
- The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
- On the founder effect and the evolution of altruistic traits
- Multi-level evolution in population games
- Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups
- The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
- A theory of group selection.
This page was built for publication: Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations
