The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_9zbMath1404.91026arXiv1805.02226OpenAlexW1602712100WikidataQ127864644 ScholiaQ127864644MaRDI QIDQ2937749

Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research, Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.02226

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesequilibrium computationalgorithmic game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) 2-person games (91A05) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values ⋮ The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer ⋮ Computational complexity of multi-player evolutionarily stable strategies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies
• New complexity results about Nash equilibria
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
• On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
• Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

This page was built for publication: The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies