Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13zbMath1406.91172arXiv1310.3153OpenAlexW2891591616MaRDI QIDQ2937754

Paul Dütting, Martin Starnberger, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3153

zbMATH Keywords

VCG mechanismcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding ⋮ Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient ⋮ Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions ⋮ Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round

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