Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_14zbMath1406.91174arXiv1309.2529OpenAlexW1578083530MaRDI QIDQ2937755

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Brendan Lucier, Michal Feldman

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.2529

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumsequential auctionscapacitated valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

The price of stability of envy-free equilibria in multi-buyer sequential auctions ⋮ Risk-free bidding in complement-free combinatorial auctions

Cites Work

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• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects

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