Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_27zbMath1348.91199OpenAlexW252166192MaRDI QIDQ2937768

Pinyan Lu, Lan Yu

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_27

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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