Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_28zbMath1406.91184OpenAlexW78353443MaRDI QIDQ2937770

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Éva Tardos

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_28

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaauctioncombinatorial public projectitem bidding mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ⋮ Item bidding for combinatorial public projects ⋮ Item Pricing for Combinatorial Public Projects ⋮ The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design

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