Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_31zbMath1406.91186arXiv1311.6883OpenAlexW2264537082MaRDI QIDQ2937773

Chaitanya Swamy, Hadi Minooei

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.6883

zbMATH Keywords

robust mechanism designprocurement auctionscorrelated players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Reverse auctions are different from auctions

This page was built for publication: Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players