Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond
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Publication:2938641
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_1zbMath1403.91259arXiv1403.1508OpenAlexW1830090996MaRDI QIDQ2938641
Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Jie Zhang, Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.1508
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