Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided Matching

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_2zbMath1403.91252arXiv1407.3957OpenAlexW1710163849MaRDI QIDQ2938642

Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang, Marek Adamczyk

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.3957

zbMATH Keywords

social welfarevon Neumann-Morgenstern preferencesone-sided matchingtruthful and symmetric mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

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