Clearing Markets via Bundles

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_14zbMath1403.91209arXiv1401.2702OpenAlexW1866670396MaRDI QIDQ2938655

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.2702

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial market designmarket-clearing combinatorial Walrasian equilibiumwelfare approximation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets

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