GLV/GLS Decomposition, Power Analysis, and Attacks on ECDSA Signatures with Single-Bit Nonce Bias

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_14zbMath1306.94023OpenAlexW2136635506MaRDI QIDQ2938849

Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz, Mehdi Tibouchi, Diego F. Aranha, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benoît Gérard, Jean-Gabriel Kammerer

Publication date: 16 January 2015

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_14

zbMATH Keywords

elliptic curve cryptographyside-channel analysisBleichenbacher's ECDSA attacksGLV/GLS method

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Applications to coding theory and cryptography of arithmetic geometry (14G50) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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