Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48054-0_44zbMath1468.91027arXiv1504.07518OpenAlexW2244060074MaRDI QIDQ2946422

Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer

Publication date: 16 September 2015

Published in: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.07518

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (5)

Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs ⋮ Coordination games on graphs ⋮ The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ⋮ Price of anarchy for graph coloring games with concave payoff ⋮ Topological price of anarchy bounds for clustering games on networks

Cites Work

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• Convergence and approximation in potential games
• Worst-case equilibria
• Short sequences of improvement moves lead to approximate equilibria in constraint satisfaction games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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• The curse of simultaneity
• Finding Social Optima in Congestion Games with Positive Externalities
• Coordination Games on Graphs (Extended Abstract)
• Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
• Edge Dominating Sets in Graphs
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy

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