Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-18173-8_20zbMath1461.91152arXiv1412.4456OpenAlexW1912243008MaRDI QIDQ2947026

Daniel Schmand, Max Klimm

Publication date: 21 September 2015

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4456

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationpure Nash equilibriacost sharing gamesShapley cost sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Cost-Sharing in Generalised Selfish Routing ⋮ Tight Bounds for Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games ⋮ A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares ⋮ On the Price of Anarchy of cost-sharing in real-time scheduling systems

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