Preventing Adaptive Key Recovery Attacks on the GSW Levelled Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-47422-9_22zbMath1381.94078OpenAlexW2530681012MaRDI QIDQ2953874

Chun-Guang Ma, Zengpeng Li, Steven D. Galbraith

Publication date: 6 January 2017

Published in: Provable Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47422-9_22

zbMATH Keywords

lattice-based cryptographyadaptive key recovery attackslevelled homomorphic encryption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (1)

A practical adaptive key recovery attack on the LGM (GSW-like) cryptosystem

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