HELPING BEHAVIOR IN LARGE SOCIETIES

DOI10.1111/iere.12197zbMath1404.91086OpenAlexW2549606314MaRDI QIDQ2956893

Francesc Dilmé

Publication date: 19 January 2017

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12197

zbMATH Keywords

large societieshelping behaviormultiplayer repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Community enforcement using modal actions

Cites Work

• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma
• Social norms and random matching games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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