Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_1zbMath1404.91002arXiv1610.04312OpenAlexW2535656431MaRDI QIDQ2959814

Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.04312

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibriumsignalingsecurity games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Uses Software

• IRIS

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
• New complexity results about Nash equilibria
• Leadership games with convex strategy sets
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness
• Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
• On the Value of Correlation
• Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
• The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium

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