Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_11zbMath1406.91140arXiv1610.04071OpenAlexW2533666786MaRDI QIDQ2959826

Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar, Elliot Anshelevich

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.04071

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationpricing mechanismsoptimum social welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare
• Applications of $$\alpha $$-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• Do prices coordinate markets?
• Algorithms and Data Structures
• Welfare and Profit Maximization with Production Costs

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