A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12zbMath1406.91177OpenAlexW2559925558MaRDI QIDQ2959828

Anna R. Karlin, Kira Goldner

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designprior-independenceadditive biddersapproximately optimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue ⋮ Bayesian auctions with efficient queries ⋮ Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

Cites Work

• Selling two goods optimally
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• On the Computational Complexity of Optimal Simple Mechanisms
• Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
• Making the Most of Your Samples
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

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