Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_13zbMath1406.91192OpenAlexW2542060167MaRDI QIDQ2959829

D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Yadati Narahari

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_13

zbMATH Keywords

two-item single-buyer optimal mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting

Cites Work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Selling two goods optimally
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
• Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening

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