Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_15zbMath1406.91276arXiv1610.09221OpenAlexW2545561640MaRDI QIDQ2959831

Qiang Zhang, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.09221

zbMATH Keywords

matching marketsenvy-free pricingascending price algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (4)

Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope
• Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets
• On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
• Single-minded unlimited supply pricing on sparse instances

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