Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_16zbMath1406.91115OpenAlexW2559814211MaRDI QIDQ2959832

Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_16

zbMATH Keywords

facility locationutility functions\(\mathsf {NP}\)-hardnessChamberlin-Courant multi-winner electionconference program design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Complexity and approximability of extended spanning star forest problems in general and complete graphs

Cites Work

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• Majority voting on restricted domains
• On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
• Precoloring extension on unit interval graphs
• The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
• On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
• Manipulation of k-Approval in Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
• A Constant Factor Approximation Algorithm for Fault-Tolerant k -Median
• On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games

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