Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
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Publication:2959835
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_19zbMath1406.91273arXiv1610.04069OpenAlexW2534558652MaRDI QIDQ2959835
Shreyas Sekar, Elliot Anshelevich
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.04069
Matching models (91B68) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
Related Items (6)
Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions ⋮ Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences ⋮ Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World ⋮ Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching ⋮ Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
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