The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_27zbMath1406.91137arXiv1610.03474OpenAlexW2531519033MaRDI QIDQ2959845

Kamesh Munagala, Ashish Goel, Brandon Fain

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03474

zbMATH Keywords

coreutility functionsparticipatory budgetingLindahl equilibriumpublic goods market equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (10)

Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule ⋮ Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency ⋮ The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem ⋮ Auditing for core stability in participatory budgeting ⋮ Core-stable committees under restricted domains ⋮ Approval-based apportionment ⋮ Participatory funding coordination: model, axioms and rules ⋮ Markets for public decision-making ⋮ Truthful aggregation of budget proposals ⋮ Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation

Cites Work

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• The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
• Market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities
• The Bargaining Problem
• The geometry of logconcave functions and sampling algorithms
• Nash Bargaining Via Flexible Budget Markets
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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