Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium
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Publication:2962266
DOI10.1073/PNAS.1400987111zbMath1355.91013OpenAlexW1966502120WikidataQ30585140 ScholiaQ30585140MaRDI QIDQ2962266
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 16 February 2017
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1400987111
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Cites Work
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- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Learning in games with unstable equilibria
- Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
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