Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences

DOI10.1137/151003854zbMath1362.68106arXiv1207.1265OpenAlexW2590284921MaRDI QIDQ2968513

Lisa Wagner, Martin Hoefer

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.1265

zbMATH Keywords

convergencestable matchingpath to stabilitylocally stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings ⋮ Stable matching with network externalities ⋮ Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Maximum locally stable matchings

Cites Work

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