Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_42zbMath1384.03110OpenAlexW2122695791MaRDI QIDQ2971705

Robert Stalnaker

Publication date: 7 April 2017

Published in: Readings in Formal Epistemology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_42

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Applications of model theory (03C98) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Related Items (15)

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic ⋮ Knowledge means ‘all’, belief means ‘most’ ⋮ The predictive role of counterfactuals ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Belief and probability: a general theory of probability cores ⋮ Dynamic logics of evidence-based beliefs ⋮ Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators ⋮ Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals ⋮ Economic harmony: an epistemic theory of economic interactions ⋮ Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies ⋮ Probabilistic dynamic belief revision ⋮ Logical Dynamics of Evidence ⋮ Reasoning about temporal properties of rational play ⋮ Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction

Cites Work

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• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions

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