Revenue deficiency under second-price auctions in a supply-chain setting

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2013.07.041zbMath1339.91060OpenAlexW2095421264MaRDI QIDQ297202

Richard Steinberg, Dolores Romero Morales

Publication date: 24 June 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.07.041

zbMATH Keywords

supply chainprocurementrevenue deficiencysecond-price auctionVCG mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Outsource planning through option contracts with demand and cost uncertainty ⋮ A complementarity model for a supply chain network equilibrium problem with electronic commerce ⋮ A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
• Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
• A multi-attribute e-auction mechanism for procurement: theoretical foundations
• RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening
• The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
• The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction’s Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?
• Multiple Sourcing and Procurement Process Selection with Bidding Events
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

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