Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:297225
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.08.018zbMath1339.91057OpenAlexW1996397603MaRDI QIDQ297225
Chris K. Anderson, Xiao-Qing Xie
Publication date: 24 June 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1813/72012
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items (10)
Which strategy is better for managing multi-product demand uncertainty: inventory substitution or probabilistic selling? ⋮ Competition and market segmentation of the call center service supply chain ⋮ Joint optimal determination of process mean, production quantity, pricing, and market segmentation with demand leakage ⋮ Optimal allocation of an opaque product with consumer learning ⋮ Modeling customer bounded rationality in operations management: a review and research opportunities ⋮ Opaque selling of multiple substitutable products with finite inventories ⋮ Coordination of a two‐echelon supply chain in presence of market segmentation, credit payment, and quantity discount policies ⋮ Pricing mechanism of variable opaque products for dual-channel online travel agencies ⋮ Research on price Stackelberg game model with probabilistic selling based on complex system theory ⋮ Market segmentation in online platforms
Cites Work
- Emotional Bidders—An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers' Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction
- Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management
- Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling
- The Name-Your-Own-Price Channel in the Travel Industry: An Analytical Exploration
- Inventory Management with Auctions and Other Sales Channels: Optimality of (s, S) Policies
- Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System
This page was built for publication: Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms