Hiding Higher-Order Side-Channel Leakage

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_8zbMath1383.94042OpenAlexW2567810792MaRDI QIDQ2975801

Tim Güneysu, Amir Moradi, Pascal Sasdrich

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2017 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25)

Related Items (1)

Protecting Triple-DES Against DPA

Uses Software

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Cites Work

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• Higher-Order Threshold Implementations
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• A White-Box DES Implementation for DRM Applications
• Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
• Consolidating Masking Schemes
• PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
• Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches
• Shuffling against Side-Channel Attacks: A Comprehensive Study with Cautionary Note
• Power Analysis Attacks

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